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DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CUSTOM AND LAW:
EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES OF ENDOGENEITY IN
PROPERTY AND FIRST AMENDMENT PRECEDENTS
Daniel L. Chen and Susan Yeh*
INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses the relationship between custom and law to highlight the
phenomenon of endogeneity that arises when empirically evaluating the effects of laws.
An important literature evaluates the roles of laws in motivating behaviors, including
investigations of whether or how laws influence customs and social norms. Traditional
economic analysis, for example, posits that codified laws influence behaviors by for-
mally incentivizing a particular action, and social norm theories assert that the laws
also communicate values.1 Enhancing this strand of thought, an increasing number of
works employing historical or empirical analyses have linked laws to broader societal
changes over time.2 Meanwhile, a valuable discourse examines how customs may deter-
mine both de facto laws and formally enacted laws, including the court precedents that
are rendered.3 Whether they are directly codified into a legal test or informally
referenced, customs can influence formal laws that are adopted in a community and
beyond. Indeed, some scholars have argued that evolving customs and norms have
influenced the Supreme Court in its decisions.4
The subsequent effects of these formal laws and court decisions are of tremendous
interest to policymakers and judges. With policy concerns in mind, we argue that one
must not ignore the endogenous feedback between aggregate behaviors, customs, and
laws. That is, while customs may shape or influence laws, laws can also shape customs
* Daniel L. Chen, Chair of Law and Economics, ETH Zurich, chendan@ethz.ch; Susan
Yeh, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, syeh2@gmu.edu.
1 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms,
86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000). In a closely related strand, legal centralists emphasize the primacy
of government-issued laws as the rules of conduct. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 138–40 (1991).
2 For examples of prior empirical or historical works that strive to draw conclusions about
the causal impact of law on norms, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS (2004) and GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991). Further literature looks
specifically into the Court’s influence on public opinions. See, e.g., VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA,
PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2003); THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC
OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989).
3 See Scott, supra note 1, at 1604.
4 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009) (discussing the impact
of public opinion on the Supreme Court).
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through their effects on behaviors or norms in the aggregate. The endogeneity that
custom produces suggests that simply by observing a correlation between law and
behavior is not enough to assert that a law in itself is effective or to assert that social
trends and evolving customs are driving legal change.5
Importantly, legal scholars from historical to international to political perspectives
recognize that the interplay between custom and law involves feedback between both.6
Individuals endorse customs partly by learning from the apparent beliefs of others
and partly by distorting their public responses in the interest of maintaining social
acceptance. “Availability entrepreneurs” manipulate the content of public discourse
and strive “to trigger availability cascades likely to advance their own agendas.”7
Public discourse, in turn, influences law. Other scholars suggest that customary inter-
national law, having no binding power on states, does not influence rational actors
who only follow custom insofar as it suits their best interest.8 Theorists have formally
modeled this relationship.9 Moreover, whether court decisions respond to the public’s
policy preferences is important in the larger context of understanding how courts may
rely on dominant customs for public legitimacy.10 However, no empirical study of
5 While a growing body of literature analyzes the channels regarding how a law interacts
with customs or examines the efficiency of customs and norms with respect to laws, this
Article’s goals are neither to claim a specific channel nor to comment on efficiency. Rather,
our first purpose is to empirically highlight, through targeted examples, how custom can be
a crucial factor in shaping formal law. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, International News Service
v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV.
85, 124–25 (1992); Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 5 (2009) (presenting an information-cost theory to explain the adoption of com-
munity customs into property law).
6 See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation,
51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999) (analyzing the channels from perception formation to regulatory
policy changes); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559 (2002) (applying
rational choice theory to explain the role of custom in international law).
7 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 687.
8 Swaine, supra note 6, at 561–62 & n.7.
9 See Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Law and Norms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 17579, 2011); Daniel L. Chen, Vardges Levonyan & Susan Yeh, Do
Policies Affect Preferences? Evidence from Random Variation in Abortion Jurisprudence
(2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors).
10 See, e.g., James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Proce-
dural Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 L. & SOC’Y REV. 469, 469 (1989) (examining “the
linkages among institutional legitimacy, perceptions of procedural justice, and voluntary
compliance with unpopular institutional decisions within the context of political intolerance
and repression”); Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: A Political Perspective, 66 U.
CIN. L. REV. 847, 847 (1998) (arguing that “legal authorities need to be concerned about public
dissatisfaction” with the law); cf. Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the
Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and
Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994) (showing that in the case of the U.S. Supreme Court,
the relationship between institutional legitimacy and empowerment is far greater than the
relationship between rational calculations and empowerment). Another scholarly approach
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custom and law sufficiently addresses this endogeneity in its causal claims, and we are
not aware of previous studies that empirically distinguish between law and custom. It
remains an open empirical question whether appellate precedent in practice is moti-
vated by customs that vary across time and space. To what extent are customs actually
driving some laws in real life?
We contribute original empirical evidence highlighting the role of custom within
court-made law in the United States. To do so, we use a narrower conception of the
relationship between custom and law.11 We focus on law as represented by court-made
appellate precedent, and to illustrate our points, we use two distinct doctrinal examples
in the United States. The first is obscenity law, where custom is directly referenced in
the law through the Miller community standards test.12 The second example is takings
law, where we argue that entrenched expectations about what constitutes just compen-
sation and public use in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment play significant
roles in shaping the law though they are not explicitly codified.13 Using datasets that we
assemble ourselves and from existing sources,14 we show that in both examples, custom
does correspond to the law in ways consistent with the expectations of legal observers.
In distinguishing the effects of law, our findings caution against relying on cor-
relations between legal and social trends.15 Through the examples of obscenity and
takings precedents, we demonstrate empirically that custom predicts the law.16 These
links indicate how customs’ roles in laws can threaten the validity of making causal
inferences about the societal effects of laws. For instance, obscenity laws often have
underlying rationales of influencing sexual behaviors or attitudes.17 Yet custom is em-
bedded in obscenity precedent under the Miller community standards test,18 so the
law is also determined by local prevailing attitudes regarding sexual behaviors, the very
outcomes that the law is attempting to regulate.
Finally, we propose a greater role for experimental or quasi-experimental evidence
among scholars interested in the empirical study of law. We sketch out an original em-
pirical strategy that could overcome the endogeneity between custom and law, as well
as between socioeconomic behaviors and law generally.19 This methodology exploits
argues that courts rely on public legitimacy as reflected by public opinion. See HOEKSTRA,
supra note 2; KLARMAN, supra note 2; MARSHALL, supra note 2; ROSENBERG, supra note 2.
But see FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 4, 7.
11 See infra Part I.A.
12 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
13 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 713–14 (1986).
14 See infra Part II.
15 See infra Part III.A.
16 See infra Part II.C.
17 See Andrew Koppelman, Essay, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1635, 1636–37 (2005).
18 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
19 See infra Parts III.A–B.
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natural experiments in formal laws, which can be used to evaluate the societal conse-
quences of appellate precedents in custom-laden or norm-driven doctrinal areas such
as takings law or obscenity law. Developed and implemented in separate papers, our
empirical framework and model are quite general, though our doctrinal applications
in this Article are only a few instances of the general relationship between norms and
law that is the subject of an extensive literature.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I of this Article provides further background
on the endogenous relationship between custom and law and describes the role of cus-
tom in takings and obscenity law in the United States. Part II describes the data and
methods and presents results illustrating the extent to which custom predicts takings
and obscenity precedent. Part III discusses a methodological strategy to overcome the
challenges that customs pose when evaluating the consequences of law.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Endogenous Relationship Between Custom and Law
Across disciplines, scholars have documented the influences of custom in legal
rules,20 theorizing about how legal rules might arise as a result of the law incorpo-
rating or heeding customs or norms of a community.21 Discussions of custom deter-
mining legal rules typically call to mind those situations where custom is expressly
referenced in doctrine or statutes. Prominent examples in classical doctrinal areas in-
clude the use of regional standards for physician practices to determine liability in
medical malpractice;22 the course of dealing standard for trade in contract law;23 the
potentially community-specific “ordinary wear and tear” baseline for determining
20 See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, The Historical Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 13,
16 (2005) (citing FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, ON THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 30 (Abraham Hayward trans., 1975) (1814)) (“Law . . . like
language, is an integral part of the common consciousness of the nation, organically connected
with the ideas and norms reflected in a people’s historically developing traditions, including
its legal tradition.”); Epstein, supra note 5, at 125; John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social
Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
477, 478 (1986) (“[S]ocial science research, when used to create a legal rule, is more analogous
to ‘law’ than to ‘fact,’ and hence should be treated much as courts treat legal precedent.”).
21 See Smith, supra note 5. Summarizing a question regarding the role that custom should
play in defining property rights, Richard Epstein writes: “[S]hould courts or legislatures refer
to custom or should they invoke general principles of positive law? Where they do the former,
their task is essentially reflective, to find out the normative rules on which parties organize
their social interaction.” Epstein, supra note 5, at 124–25.
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965); see also Michael Frakes, The Impact
of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations in Physician Behavior: Evidence from
the Adoption of National-Standard Rules, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 257 (2013).
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223 (1981).
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waste in landlord-tenant law;24 and the Miller community standards test for obscenity,
which we further investigate in this Article.
Loosely defined, custom can also influence the law without being expressly refer-
enced in legal rules.25 This de facto legal role of custom has been documented in situ-
ations such as negotiations “in the shadow of the law,”26 or more generally, situations
where people adjust their behaviors based on their expectations of how courts might
approach a controversy.27 In other words, entrenched traditions as well as prevailing
trends outside of statutes or legal precedent determine the true rules of conduct even
though the disputes do not actually reach litigation in the courtroom. Notably, this
phenomenon can apply to property law, with scholars asserting that property laws
and statutes emerge from existing practices common to a community rather than being
imposed by policymakers who are “making” the law.28
Regardless of how custom influences law or how custom exists around law, one
must consider that laws can also determine customs. Certainly, there is abundant
policy and scholarly interest in evaluating the effects of laws on people’s actions, as
well as the impacts of laws on motivating broader societal change.29 As laws change
people’s behaviors in the aggregate, it is not unreasonable for norms of what is con-
sidered acceptable practice in the community to also shift as a result of laws. In the
social norms literature, legal theorists have asserted that the law can shape people’s
preferences and behaviors by communicating what a social norm is or what policy-
makers believe it should be.30 Accordingly, some laws may encourage behaviors to
more closely abide by an existing (or desired) norm, further perpetuating or transform-
ing customs.31
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 12.2(3) (1977).
25 We acknowledge the considerable historical and doctrinal scholarship devoted to iden-
tifying and describing custom, and we rely on existing works to infer which practices generally
are considered to be custom in relation to formal law.
26 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
27 Epstein, supra note 5, at 86 (noting that “custom is the result of repeated interactions,
trial and error” and “when a dispute arises, the custom effectively binds the litigants”).
28 See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 254; WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS
351–53 (1995); Epstein, supra note 5, at 85.
29 See, e.g., Kemit A. Mawakana, Power and Law, Bait and Switch: Debunking “Law”
as a Tool of Societal Change, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 93, 96–97 (2011); Sally Falk Moore,
Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of
Study, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 719, 719 (1973).
30 The simplified view of the expressive function of law is that people find it costly to
deviate too much from the norms as communicated by the law. Therefore, people will adjust
their behaviors to comply with the law, independently of the actual costs of breaking the law.
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591
(1996); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
31 See Sunstein, supra note 30, at 2052.
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Such reactions apply across doctrinal areas and in government policies. As a con-
crete illustration from tort law, changes in state laws on medical malpractice liability
have corresponded to a shift by physicians away from regional medical customs to-
wards behaviors consistent with national practices in the United States.32 In the public
health arena, where local norms are of concern to policymakers hoping to change risky
behaviors, critics have argued that high-profile government anti-obesity campaigns
would encourage the shaming of obese people.33 Indeed, one study finds that depend-
ing on the community, stricter anti-obesity laws correspond to greater social stigma
for obese persons, reinforcing anti-obesity norms.34 And in patent law, it has been
argued that Federal Circuit precedent expands the boundaries of inventions that are
patentable,35 which would then create new, perhaps implicit, standards that would af-
fect parties’ incentives to innovate.36 Such examples show that endogenous relation-
ships between custom and law occur when custom influences law, which in turn may
further affect local customs or norms.
Economists and political scientists have recognized endogeneity as a substantial
curveball in determining optimal policies. Endogenous models figure prominently in
central banking and monetary rulemaking, where inflationary expectations inform pol-
icy decisions to which people respond by adjusting their expectations and behaviors.37
As recognized in the political economy literature, government policies are endogenous
with voter behaviors: constituents’ preferences and practices affect elections and legis-
lative results,38 which in turn can shape economic outcomes.39 In empirical analyses,
32 Frakes, supra note 22, at 5, 12.
33 See David Crary, Do Georgia’s Child Obesity Ads Go Too Far?, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 1, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/02/georgia-child-obesity-ads_n_856255
.html; Tara Parker-Pope, Fat Stigma is Fast Becoming a Global Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
2011, at A1.
34 Susan Yeh, Laws and Social Norms: Unintended Consequences of Obesity Laws, 81
U. CIN. L. REV. 173 (2013).
35 Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011).
36 Id. at 480; see also JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 2–3 (2008); Michael A.
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Bio-
medical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998).
37 See OTMAR ISSING ET AL., IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE AND MONETARY POLICY 1–11
(2005); Thomas W. Synnott, III, The Great Inflation: Inflation, Inflationary Expectations,
and the Phillips Cycle 1960–2002, 43 BUS. ECON. 34, 35, 37 (2008); James VanderHoff,
Direct Evidence on Endogenous Expectation Formation Methods, 28 Q. REV. ECON. & BUS.
6, 6 (1988).
38 See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic
Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits, 110 Q. J. ECON. 769, 769–70
(1995); James M. Poterba, State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Insti-
tutions and Politics, 102 J. POL. ECON. 799, 799–800, 813 (1994).
39 Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of
Endogenous Policies, 110 ECON. J. F672, F672 (2000).
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neglecting to address endogeneity in law leads to biased estimates and spurious con-
clusions about the impacts of law on people’s behaviors. However, only recently has
endogeneity and feedback in judicial precedent begun to be more widely acknowl-
edged as a phenomenon by legal scholars.40
More generally, understanding how to disentangle these feedbacks when estimat-
ing the causal impact of court-made law on custom is important because it could affect
the legitimacy of judicial decisions. An example of a formal model of the endogenous
relationship between custom and law as it applies to abortion law is presented by
Chen, Levonyan, and Yeh.41 This theoretical model illustrates how decisions can gen-
erate backlash, depending on how far the values communicated by a judicial decision
deviate from dominant social norms.
In the next subsections, we empirically establish that customs correlate with trends
in appellate precedent in obscenity and takings doctrine. Such correlations highlight
the endogeneity problems in evaluating the policy rationales crucial to court decisions
in these areas.
B. Custom in Obscenity Precedent and Policy Rationales of Morality
Appellate obscenity precedent in the United States provides an excellent illustra-
tion of the endogenous links among custom, behavior, and legal rules. In the United
States, judicial precedent effectively serves as the law on obscenity, determining the
scope of allowable obscenity regulation.42 Here, obscenity precedent explicitly relies
on custom in the local community. Since 1973, obscenity doctrine has relied on the
Supreme Court’s Miller community standards test43 to define whether or not an ex-
pression is obscene. This three-part test deems an expression to be obscene if: (1) “the
average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find that the
material “appeals to the prurient interest”; (2) has “patently offensive [depictions of]
sexual conduct”; and (3) “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”44
40 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 481–82 (2011); Masur, supra note 35, at 472–74.
41 Chen, Levonyan & Yeh, supra note 9.
42 Obscenity regulations in the United States are represented at local, state, and federal
levels of government and are subject to Constitutional scrutiny by courts. See, e.g., Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). While there are statutes and regulations addressing specific
areas of conduct at the federal level, such as FCC regulations prohibiting obscene matter in
television broadcasts or federal statutes proscribing interstate transport of obscene material,
there is no umbrella federal statute on obscenity in the United States.
43 See id. at 37.
44 Id. at 24. Prior to Miller, the Roth test also applied custom in determining obscenity:
“whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.” Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
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Community standards apply to the first two prongs, while the third prong relies on
national reasonable person standards.45
While what constitutes the relevant “community” is subject to some discretion and
becoming increasingly controversial due to the rise of the Internet and global media,46
courts have traditionally interpreted “community” according to geography.47 In theory,
because of the Miller test, it is logical to expect that trends in obscenity precedent and
prosecutions would track local customs and norms about sexual behaviors. That is, the
same sexually explicit content would generate more permissive obscenity precedent in
places with more liberal sexual attitudes than in places with more conservative attitudes.
On the other hand, although observers initially argued that Miller would favor conserva-
tive communities in more aggressively proscribing sexual materials,48 cases such as
Utah v. Peterman49 reveal that liberal national trends in sexual attitudes and behaviors
can still dominate where local customs favor very conservative regulation.50 Hence,
whether regional customs actually predict trends and outcomes in obscenity precedent
poses an open empirical question. In view of this, in Part II we test for the presence of
community standards in appellate obscenity precedent. We show evidence that region-
specific norms can predict variation in the permissiveness of obscenity precedent
across circuits even while standards might be changing nationwide.51
The fact that community standards determine obscenity precedent brings to the
forefront the endogenous relationship between obscenity law and people’s conduct
or values. An important assumption underlying obscenity decisions is the belief that
they will affect morals and sexual behaviors.52 Major Supreme Court obscenity rulings
45 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; John Fee, Obscenity and the World Wide Web, 2007 BYU
L. REV. 1691, 1695, 1706 n.63, 1709.
46 See, e.g., Fee, supra note 45, at 1691; Matthew Dawson, Comment, The Intractable
Obscenity Problem 2.0: The Emerging Circuit Split over the Constitutionality of “Local
Community Standards” Online, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 719, 721–22, 748 (2011).
47 See, e.g., U.S. v. Henson, 513 F.2d 156, 158 (9th Cir. 1975).
48 In a separate work, we document a dramatic increase in the numbers of conservative ap-
pellate obscenity decisions immediately following the Miller decision. See Daniel L. Chen &
Susan Yeh, How Do Rights Revolutions Occur? Theory and Evidence from First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 1958–2008 (Oct. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors).
49 Case No. 961401694 (4th Dist. Ct. Utah Cnty. Mar. 1999).
50 See id. In Peterman, a video store owner was being prosecuted for violating a Utah
obscenity statute. Remarkably, the jury did not convict Peterman for selling pornography de-
spite the extremely conservative locale of Utah County. Peterman revealed that in even one
of the most conservative places in the United States, substantial numbers of people in the
community were consuming pornographic materials, consistent with national trends in tech-
nology and pornography distribution. See Timothy Egan, Erotica Inc.—A Special Report;
Technology Sent Wall Street Into Market for Pornography, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23 2000, http://
www.nytimes.com/2000/10/23/us/erotica-special-report-technology-sent-wall-street-into
-market-for-pornography.html?/pagewanted=all&src=pm.
51 See infra Part II.
52 See Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1639.
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have claimed to have policy rationales of protecting society from the general prolif-
eration of moral harm,53 as well as “secondary effects” such as sexual violence and
sexually transmitted diseases.54 Because obscenity precedents are endogenous, one
cannot evaluate their effects merely by observing changes in sexual attitudes follow-
ing a court decision, since those social trends may be the reasons for the decisions in
the first place. To distinguish obscenity law from community standards, one would
need an exogenous policy change or a natural experiment.55
C. Custom in Takings Precedent
Custom is present in the law of takings through legal precedent as well as in en-
trenched expectations. Notably, community norms can be implied or embedded in
regulatory takings decisions, a phenomenon that has been explored by a number of
property scholars,56 and which we discuss now. Recall that in the United States, a
regulation of property could reach the extent of a taking requiring just compensation
according to the Fifth Amendment.57 It is commonly taught that regulatory takings
doctrine originated with the 1922 decision of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,58 in
which Justice Holmes deemed a taking to occur when a regulation “goes too far” by
depriving a property owner of all reasonable use or value of the property.59
To an extent, norms are implied in interpreting the “goes too far” standard.60
Indeed, Henry Smith points out that the “goes too far” rule in Mahon is “a question
53 See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 78–83 (1989); Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50, 71–73 (1976).
54 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640–43 (1968); Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192,
200 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1636, 1679 (asserting that ob-
scenity doctrine is driven by moral concerns, despite assumptions that the rationales are to
protect people from physical harm).
55 See infra Part III.
56 See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 1; FISCHEL, supra note 28, at 307–55; William A.
Fischel, The Law and Economics of Cedar-Apple Rust: State Action and Just Compensation
in Miller v. Schoene, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 1 (2007); Smith, supra note 5. Scholars have analyzed
customs in property rights generally. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 13, at 741–42.
57 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
58 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
59 Id. at 415.
60 In Mahon, the Court did not offer specific guidance beyond the standard of “goes too
far” in determining whether a government action constitutes a regulatory taking. Id. Sub-
sequently, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) set forth a
balancing test of economic impacts, interference with investment-backed expectations, and
the character of the action. Id. at 130–31. And Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992), establishes that regulatory takings include “all-or-nothing” scenarios with
the deprivation of all economically viable use of property value. Id. at 1014–19, 1029–30. But
balancing tests are vague and subject to much discretion, and even with Lucas’s categorical 
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of degree”61 regarding the appropriateness of regulating private property for public
use. As a relative concept, the degree of “too far” implies that what is customary or
expected would matter as a baseline in deciding whether just compensation was due.
Consider a property use restriction that is long entrenched in the community. The view
is that because this restriction is a long-standing norm, it would not be considered a
taking even if it happens to deplete one’s property values.62 Along these lines, Henry
Smith suggests that in takings law, custom is important in “defin[ing] the baseline of
entitlement against which a regulation’s effect on the owner’s property interest can
be measured.”63
Because baselines differ across communities, they can lead to very different legal
decisions regarding takings or property rights.64 In this way, custom further shapes
regulatory takings law through the Supreme Court’s applications of common law in
nuisance.65 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,66 the Supreme Court ruled
that a regulation preventing a public nuisance is not a taking.67 Noting this, Smith char-
acterizes the common law of nuisance in takings as providing a property rights base-
line whose interpretation would depend on customary practices in the community.68
In physical takings, custom can play an important role in courts’ interpretation
of whether an exercise of eminent domain satisfies the public use requirement of the
Takings Clause.69 As early as Clark v. Nash,70 the Supreme Court suggested that
public use could be determined by custom, depending on “some peculiar condition
of the soil or climate, or other peculiarity of the State.”71 In Clark, the Court upheld
a state statute allowing an individual farmer to condemn property by digging a ditch
across another farmer’s land in order to access river waters.72 The Court suggested
holding, it remains unclear what actions count as “goes too far” in the wide range between
“all” or “nothing.”
61 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
62 See Smith, supra note 5, at 37.
63 Id. at 36. Smith also observes that Lucas “hold[s] that regulations that prohibit all econom-
ically beneficial uses of land are takings if they prohibit uses not actionable under prior ‘back-
ground law’ of property and nuisance.” Id. at 34 n.109 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029–30).
64 See id. at 34, 36, 40–41.
65 Id. at 38.
66 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
67 Id. at 1031–32 (“South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance and
property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the circumstances in which the property
is presently found. Only on this showing can the State fairly claim that, in proscribing all such
beneficial uses, the Beachfront Management Act is taking nothing.”).
68 Smith, supra note 5, at 36. Moreover, custom is directly invoked in landmark nuisance
decisions. In the classic case Sturges v. Bridgman, the Court ruled that a locality’s existing
practices determine whether or not there is nuisance liability. Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879]
11 Ch. 852, 865 (Eng.).
69 See Smith, supra note 5, at 36–37.
70 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
71 Id. at 368.
72 Id. at 369–70.
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that such use of waters was a public use based on practices that emerged from the
locality’s arid geography, population, and demands.73 Indeed, one scholar classifies
the Clark decision as descending from the custom of “allocating [property] rights by
priority” that had developed over time in “the arid West.”74 Later, citing the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Kelo v. City of New London,75 the Nichols treatise on eminent do-
main also acknowledges judicial deference to custom: because property use directly
affects a community’s economic well-being, local practices and conditions are likely
to guide courts’ interpretation of what constitutes public use.76 Thus, the definition of
“public use” is fluid and changes over time and across communities, depending on
prevalent customs and socioeconomic circumstances.77
In this way, local economic measures can embody the customs that influence
takings precedents. A concrete example of how a custom based on monetary values
determined takings law is explored by William Fischel in his analysis of Miller v.
Schoene,78 which favored the uncompensated destruction of cedar trees to save apple
trees amid a threat of fungus that could reside on either tree type.79 Fischel observes
that the legal rule that “prices make rights” was a codification of a long-accepted
norm at the time favoring higher-valued commodities (apple trees) over lower-valued
commodities (cedar trees).80 The baseline practice here is to prefer the higher-valued
resources, which had higher demand by the public in that particular market. As a result,
it is plausible that one may observe that higher commodity or property values lead to
court decisions that would be favorable towards owners of those commodities.
Importantly, Fischel observes “that commercial value itself is partly the product
of a system of laws, so that there is an element of circularity in the claim that prices
made rights.”81 He cautions against attributing commercial outcomes to courts and
laws, arguing that customs that precede the law (such as institutions and individual
preferences) explain both economic outcomes and variations in legal regimes.82 Thus,
rationales of government takings can be endogenous with economic outcomes. More-
over, given the public use requirement, a natural policy question concerns whether emi-
nent domain will actually reap public benefits such as blight removal83 or economic
growth,84 which skeptics of eminent domain worry that governments may unjustifiably
73 Id. at 370.
74 A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV.
881, 890 (2000).
75 843 A.2d 500, 524 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
76 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.02.
77 Id. § 7.02 n.5.
78 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
79 See Fischel, supra note 56, at 1.
80 Id. at 24.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28–29 (1954).
84 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005) (upholding a taking for
a private developer with rationales that it would improve the city’s economic outcomes).
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be claiming at the outset when initiating a taking.85 Some decisionmakers, including
Justices O’Connor and Thomas, criticize eminent domain precedent such as Kelo as
potentially hurting minority groups in terms of their housing situations and local em-
ployment opportunities in urban areas.86
Because of the circularity in the relationship between custom, economic conditions,
and legal decisions, it is not a straightforward endeavor to evaluate the causal effects
of takings. Economic trends leading up to condemnations and regulations may differ
vastly across cities and regions. To what extent do local economic situations (customs)
predict precedents that make it easier or harder for governments to take? We shed light
on this question not only to contribute empirical evidence on custom’s explanatory
power in law for its own sake, but also to more solidly illustrate the endogeneity prob-
lem when analyzing the economic efficiency and distributional effects of takings.
II. EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES
Using ordinary least square regressions, we examine whether data support the
argument that customs are predictive of trends in legal precedent. In obscenity, where
custom is directly codified into the doctrine,87 we analyze whether community stan-
dards, proxied by local attitudes regarding sexual behaviors, are predictive of more
liberal obscenity decisions at the appellate level.88 In takings law, we examine a pos-
sible link between locale-specific, preexisting economic norms and trends in court
precedents making it easier or harder for the government to regulate or physically
take property.89
Economists have theorized that takings with just compensation lead to overinvestment or inef-
ficient allocation of resources. See, e.g., Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro,
The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 100 Q. J. ECON. 71 (1984); Louis
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986).
85 Daniel L. Chen & Susan Yeh, The Impact of Government Power to Expropriate on
Growth and Inequality 2 (Jan. 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors).
86 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 505–06 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
see also In the Footprint: The Battle Over Atlantic Yards (the Civilians Investigative Theater,
2010) (musical criticizing the impacts of the Atlantic Yards project on minority urban dwellers).
The development economics literature links secure property rights with agricultural pro-
ductivity and housing investment. See Erica Field, Property Rights and Investment in Urban
Slums, 3 J. EUR. ECON. ASSOC. 279 (2005) (examining the relationship of increased property
rights on investment in urban slums); Richard Hornbeck, Barbed Wire: Property Rights and
Agricultural Development, 125 Q. J. ECON. 767 (2010) (examining the impact of the intro-
duction of barbed wire fences on agricultural development in the American Plains). Insecure
property rights in U.S. takings law most likely would arise if the government undercompensates
the property owner. Chen & Yeh, supra note 85.
87 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth a test for obscenity and
incorporating a contemporary community standards prong).
88 See infra Part II.A.1.
89 See infra Part II.A.2.
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A. Data
1. Obscenity
Our data on obscenity decisions are assembled from several sources. Federal
appellate-level obscenity precedents come mainly from a study by Sunstein et al.;90
we apply the corrections by Jonathan Kastellec.91 Through our own data collection and
coding, we extend the series to 2008, giving us a total of 186 obscenity cases in 612
circuit years for 1958–2008. These data were coded to include the names of the judges
on each case’s panel and their individual votes.92 Decisions that find that the activity
was not obscene within the meaning of the law are coded as “liberal,” which corre-
sponds to a “liberal” obscenity law. In these obscenity cases, a liberal obscenity deci-
sion could mean that the court held that material itself was not obscene according to
obscenity-defining criteria, such as the Miller test.93 A liberal obscenity decision could
also mean that the court considered that individual interest in free expression out-
weighed the state’s interest in protecting individuals from the effects of obscenity,
as the rationale provides in Ginsberg v. New York.94
To construct outcome variables measuring moral attitudes and sexual behaviors
reflecting community customs or norms, we use the General Social Survey (GSS).95
As a nationally representative survey across the United States, the GSS provides
90 CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? (2006). These data were compiled
first with Lexis searches of cases citing key Supreme Court obscenity decisions and then nar-
rowed to cases decided on substantive grounds regarding obscenity. Id. at 161. Sunstein et al.
review cases citing to Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957), and A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v.
Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Id. We follow this method and
extend the series to 2008.
91 Chen, Levonyan, & Yeh, supra note 9, at 13 & n.18. Programming code is on file
with authors.
92 See infra Part II.B.
93 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
94 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). In the dataset, many of the obscenity
cases involve challenges to charges of the distribution, production, or possession of obscene
materials. Some examples include: Eckstein v. Melson, 18 F.3d 1181 (4th Cir. 1994) (selling
magazines and books with explicit sexual imagery), Penthouse International, Ltd. v. McAuliffe,
702 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1983) (showing a Penthouse movie), and United States v. Keller, 259
F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1958) (mailing postcards containing indecent language). More recently, cases
in the 1990s and 2000s involve downloading images from the internet, see United States v.
Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996), and making lewd phone calls, see United States v.
Landham, 251 F.3d 1072 (6th Cir. 2001). Based on the legal tests and precedents referring
to community norms, it is ex ante plausible that judges employ sexual custom in making
decisions regarding obscenity.
95 GEN. SOC. SURV., http://publicdata.norc.org:41000/gssbeta/index.html (last visited
Apr. 16, 2013).
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individual-level information on the demographic characteristics of individual respon-
dents and their attitudes towards various situations and societal phenomena.96 The
survey was conducted annually from 1973 to 1994 (except for 1979, 1981, and 1992),
and biannually from 1994 to 2004,97 giving a total of 44,897 sample individuals be-
tween 1973 and 2004.98 For our analysis in this Article, our variables of interest are of
two categories: (1) attitudes towards more liberal sexual behaviors such as premarital
sex, extramarital sex, teen sex, and same-sex sex;99 and (2) actual sexual behaviors, for
example casual sex.
To measure actual sexual behaviors, we use both self-reports from the GSS and
government statistics on diseases by state. Custom may be revealed in behaviors that
are observable outside of individuals’ self-reports. Riskier sexual practices can corre-
spond with the spread of venereal diseases, which courts have mentioned as a harmful
effect that would warrant obscenity regulation.100 We obtain the incidence (new cases)
of sexually transmitted disease (STD) chlamydia for each state from 1984 to 2008
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.101
2. Takings
We use data on all federal appellate regulatory takings published decisions from
1979 to 2004 collected by Sunstein et al.102 We apply a similar methodology to
96 Id.
97 GSS Variables, Variables by Year, GEN. SOC. SURV., http://www3.norc.org/GSS
+Website/Browse+GSS+Variables/Collections/ (lasted visited Apr. 16, 2013).
98 Dataset: GSS, 1972–2006 (Cumulative File), GEN. SOC. SURV., http://www3.norc.org
/GSS+Website/Browse+GSS+Variables/Collections/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). For each of
these survey years, a cross-sectional sample of residents of the United States who are at least
eighteen years old was randomly selected. The GSS consists of individual responses from
around 1,500 respondents for each survey year between 1973 and 1992, and around 2,900
respondents per survey year from 1994 to 2004. Id.
99 In this Article, we use a summary index of a series of separate questions regarding sexual
attitudes. For details on how we constructed this index, see Chen & Yeh, supra note 48.
100 See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 79 n.18 (1989). Footnote 19 refer-
ences statements of Senator Helms when proposing the addition of state and federal obscenity
violations as predicate offenses under Federal Rico: “Surely it is not coincidential [sic] that,
as [sic] a time in our history when pornography and obscene materials are rampant, we are
also experiencing record levels of promiscuity, veneral [sic] diseases, herpes.” Id. at n.19.
101 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Div. of STD/HIV Prevention, Sexually Trans-
mitted Disease Morbidity 1984–2008, CDC WONDER ONLINE DATABASE (Nov. 2009),
http://wonder.cdc.gov/std-v2008.html.
102 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. Decisions of the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims were excluded. We obtained the data directly from authors. The cases were identified
by tracking the citations of the following landmark Supreme Court decisions, and it is reason-
able that most takings cases would cite one or more of these cases: Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S.
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collect appellate physical takings decisions from 1975 to 2008.103 If the judge voted to
grant the party alleging a violation of the Takings Clause any relief, then the vote was
coded as a pro-plaintiff vote. If the judge voted against that party and instead voted in
favor of the government that engaged in the alleged taking, then the vote was coded as
a pro-government vote. The sample includes only cases that had substantive decisions
about takings, rather than cases that were decided only on procedural grounds.
Following our discussion of local economic trends or situations as reflecting cus-
tomary expectations, we proxy for custom using economic outcome variables. First,
we use property values at the zip-code level from Fiserv Case-Shiller database.104 The
Fiserv data cover the entire United States, and we use the data to construct a panel of
about 41,000 zip codes followed quarterly from 1975 to 2008.105 In some checks, we
weigh the zip-code level price indexes by zip-code population from the U.S. Census.106
We use the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group’s (MORG) Current Population Survey
(CPS) for minority employment outcomes.107 Data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
by state and year were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.108
825 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 90, at 158 n.6.
103 We shephardized Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); and Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
104 Home Price Indexes, FISERV, http://www.caseshiller.fiserv.com/fiserv-case-shiller-home
-price-index-changes.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
105 The Case-Shiller indices are based on repeat sales data on single-family homes. See
About the Indexes, FISERV, http://www.caseshiller.fiserv.com/about-fiserv-case-shiller-indexes
.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). In geographic areas that do not have a valid Case-Shiller price
index, Fiserv splices in the corresponding Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) index.
Id. The FHFA series is a quarterly, weighted, repeat-sales single family house price index based
on repeat mortgage transactions handled by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Id. We weigh the
zip code Fiserv price indices using zip code specific population estimates calculated for 2005
from the U.S. Census.
106 The Census data documentation is located at U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS OF
POPULATION AND HOUSING (2007), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf1.pdf.
107 CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., http://www.nber
.org/data/morg.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). Information on individual employment out-
comes, including weekly earnings, amount of time worked, and employment status, was ob-
tained from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) Current Population Survey (CPS).
The MORG provides point-in-time measures of the individual-level variables, including age,
sex, race, marital status, educational attainment, and the geographic location of the individual
(matching the state of residence to the circuit having legal jurisdiction). See id. We restrict
our sample to individuals between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five.
108 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, Widespread Economic Growth Across States in 2011,
BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS (June 5, 2012), https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp
_state/gsp_highlights.pdf. These estimates are aggregated across all industries.
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B. Measuring Law
We construct a measure of law specific to each appellate circuit and year. For
obscenity precedents, we calculate the percentage of appellate obscenity decisions
within a circuit and year that have a liberal outcome, i.e., the three-judge panel con-
cludes that a particular activity or expression should not be punished for being obscene.
For regulatory and physical takings (separately), we measure pro-government takings
precedents as the percentage of appellate takings cases that are decided in favor of the
government. This percentage allows us to measure trends in pro-government takings
decisions net of pro-plaintiff decisions in a circuit and year. Intuitively, this percentage
captures whether an appellate decision in favor of the government, on the margin,
makes it easier overall for a litigant to bring and win suit contesting a government regu-
lation, condemnation, or other action. We justify these law measures econometrically
in separate papers.109
C. Results and Implications of Custom in Law
In each set of regressions below, we examine the correlation between appellate
precedent in the current year and custom in the preceding year. If judges take cus-
tom into account, we should expect to see a correlation between custom and judicial
decisions. Each pair of columns in the results that follow show an ordinary least squares
correlation between appellate law and a proxy for custom and an ordinary least squares
correlation between the two variables while controlling for time-invariant character-
istics within a circuit and circuit-invariant characteristics within a year. We limit our
robustness checks to turning on and off these time-invariant and circuit-invariant
characteristics since these statistical correlations are intended merely to illustrate the
possibility that custom influences the law rather than to prove definitively that a causal
relationship exists.
Table 1—Relationship Between Custom and Obscenity Law
Liberal Obscenity Precedent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sexual Attitudes -0.00580
(0.00414)
-0.00946*
(0.00390)
Casual Sex -0.0138+
(0.00824)
-0.00957
(0.00751)
Chlamydia -0.000118*
(0.0000589)
0.000130
(0.0000817)
N 40409 40409 23566 23566 1118 1118
R-sq 0.105 0.229 0.001 0.172 0.004 0.188
109 See Chen & Yeh, supra note 48; Chen & Yeh, supra note 85.
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Consistent with the idea that community customs are predictive of judge-made
obscenity legal outcomes, Table 1 shows a statistically significant correlation between
local sexual attitudes and the percentage of liberal obscenity precedent in an appellate
circuit and year when time-invariant and circuit-invariant characteristics are controlled
for. There is also a correlation between casual sex prevalence and the percentage of
liberal obscenity decisions, as well as between local chlamydia prevalence rates and
liberal obscenity decisions when time-invariant and circuit-invariant characteristics
are not controlled for.
Table 2—Relationship Between Custom and Takings Law
Panel A Pro-Government Regulatory Takings Precedent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Property Prices 0.00944**
(0.000808)
0.0290**
(0.00157)
Minority Employment 0.00659**
(0.000823)
-0.000377
(0.000730)
Log GDP 0.0123
(0.00766)
-0.0271**
(0.00953)
N 2981400 2981400 1378649 1378649 1680 1680
R-sq 0.000 0.188 0.000 0.219 0.002 0.208
Panel B Pro-Government Physical Takings Precedent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Property Prices 0.110**
(0.000371)
0.121**
(0.000950)
Minority Employment 0.00494**
(0.000634)
-0.00107+
(0.000560)
Log GDP 0.0313**
(0.0113)
-0.00198
(0.0127)
N 4054704 4054704 1864977 1864977 1323 1323
R-sq 0.021 0.190 0.000 0.225 0.006 0.238
Similarly, we find that economic circumstances predict trends in takings laws by
region. Table 2 shows strong and statistically significant correlations between local
economic outcomes preceding takings decisions and the probabilities of takings deci-
sions that are pro-government in the circuit.
As we have shown, past social and economic outcomes can be correlated with
later laws. Given these correlations, it is difficult to ascertain a causal effect of the law
on social or economic outcomes that are observed after the law has been promulgated.
This is because those social or economic situations may be changing over time, regard-
less of the legal decision. Moreover, there may be other factors, like custom, that are
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driving social or economic outcomes before as well as after the legal decision. Studies
that rely only on correlations are less likely to have a causal interpretation.
III. A SOLUTION THROUGH NATURAL EXPERIMENTS
A. Intuition
Making definitive conclusions about the impacts of court-made law is no easy
task. Indeed, as suggested by both the Miller test110 as well as in actual data linking
trends in sexual norms with obscenity law,111 norms and customs drive judicial deci-
sions. How, then, do we ascertain a causal effect from judicial decisions to the norms?
Distinguishing correlation from causation is difficult for reasons beyond the crucial
role of norms. There is often a long lag between cause and effect, and courts make de-
cisions in different ways depending to some extent on external factors, be they litigant
strategy, developments in legal doctrine, or social trends. Observational studies are fre-
quently confounded by other factors, which tend to move in tandem with the treat-
ment of interest. The common approach of “controlling for” potential confounders in
a multivariate regression is not satisfactory112 and can accentuate the problem of omitted
variable bias.113 Moreover, problems in making causal inferences become more pro-
nounced with judge-made law, where judges may use future societal trends as a factor
in their decisionmaking. Even if omitted variables are adequately controlled for, reverse
causality remains a problem.
Refutable research hypotheses about the effects of court-made law can be eval-
uated in an observational setting where identifying variation is plausibly exogenous.
The hypothesis may have several implications, which can be evaluated in available
data. The most compelling empirical comparisons do not require sophisticated econo-
metric fixes.114 Instead, good natural experiments identify treatment effects with min-
imal statistical adjustment.115 The cleanest of experiments—where the treatment (of
court-made law) is randomly assigned—requires only the comparison of means to esti-
mate causal effects. This controlled experiment should be emulated wherever possible.
Operationally, the proposed approach seeks to unearth comparisons in an observational
setting where unadjusted impact estimates are quite similar to regression-adjusted
impact estimates.
110 See Miller v. California, 415 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
111 See Robert B. Cairns et al., Sex Censorship: the Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws
and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1009–12 (1962).
112 See David A. Freedman, Statistical Models and Shoe Leather, 21 SOC. METHODOLOGY
291 (1991).
113 See, e.g., Kevin A. Clarke, The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric
Research, 22 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 341 (2005).
114 Cf. Freedman, supra note 112, at 292 (arguing that regression models can be “technical
fixes [that] do not solve the problems” in a causal argument).
115 Id. at 304, 307.
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The ideal way to estimate a causal effect of court-made law would be to ask a court
to randomize judicial decisions, much as a scientist would conduct a randomized con-
trol trial.116 This scenario is unlikely to come to pass and, indeed, arguably undermines
the notion of judging. But we have a close approximation in the random assignment
of appellate judges who, in exercising their judicial discretion, often interpret the facts
and the law in a slightly different manner that is correlated with their demographic
background characteristics. This “local knowledge” and the practice of stare decisis
provide key ingredients for an instrumental variables approach to developing causal
estimates of court-made law.117
The key problem in estimating the effects of court-made law is that there are many
causal factors that contribute to judicial precedent in any given circuit or year.118 Some
of these factors may have direct or indirect effects on the outcomes of interest. We can
control for as many of these causal factors as possible, but we never know if there
might be additional omitted variables. Our instrumental variables approach isolates
one particular causal factor that will be uncorrelated with other social trends and legal
developments. We do this by exploiting the random variation in the demographic com-
position of the judge panels sitting on a set of cases, which arises because the judges
are randomly assigned.119 The judges’ biographies predict their decisions on the judi-
cial panels.120 Provided that the demographic composition does not also have direct
effects on socio-economic outcomes, we can infer that the judicial decisions them-
selves had a causal impact on social and economic outcomes.
Appellate courts determine a significant portion of cases that shape the law in the
United States.121 This effective making of law occurs since decisions become prece-
dents for decisions in future cases. More formally, we can isolate an unexpected com-
ponent of appellate jurisprudence using the random assignment of appellate judges to
particular case types (e.g., obscenity decisions). The random assignment of judges to
appellate cases creates exogenous variation in legal precedent that is not due to social
trends or other legal developments.
We expect to see appellate judicial decisions to have effects on agents’ behaviors
if judges follow precedent and appellate decisions on the margin make it easier for
116 See Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 1005 (2011)
(arguing that randomizing legal rules is informative in evaluating policy).
117 Among others, Adam Samaha has recognized the potential of randomized case assignment
for research. See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1, 7 (2009) (noting that “random assignment creates a natural experiment” and “[t]rustworthy
empirical study may depend on such lotteries for insight into judicial behavior”).
118 See id. at 63–65 (explaining the concerns “that random case assignment will effectively
randomize merits decisions”).
119 Chen & Yeh, supra note 48, at 3 (explaining the empirical strategy used to determine
how judges’ demographic characteristics affect appellate decisions).
120 Id.
121 See generally DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS 4–5 (2002).
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subsequent plaintiffs to bring and win suit. For example, allowing city ordinances
restrictive of sexual expression when theater owners merely intend to exhibit adult
motion pictures, even if there may be some uncertainty about their secondary effects,122
would make it harder for subsequent plaintiffs to challenge obscenity regulations.
Then individual actors in the economy or in the government may respond to appel-
late decisions as they become known through local community leaders, newspaper
publicity,123 lawyer advocates,124 or consultants who emphasize the risk of suit after
major appellate decisions.125
Our strategy therefore overcomes the community standards and other factors that
would otherwise be endogenous with obscenity decisions as follows: Democratic
appointees are more likely to vote liberally on obscenity cases. When judges are ran-
domly assigned to three-judge appellate panels, there will be arbitrarily more or fewer
Democratic appointees. Therefore, there should be arbitrarily more or fewer liberal
votes on obscenity cases, respectively. To clarify, our strategy does not rely on cases
getting more Democratic appointees in the Ninth Circuit, a generally more liberal court
with a greater percentage of Democratic appointees than the Fourth Circuit.126 “Rather,
the strategy relies on the fact that from year to year, the proportion of obscenity cases
[within the Ninth Circuit] that are assigned Democratic appointees varies in a random
manner.”127 In years with an unexpectedly high proportion of obscenity cases with
Democratic appointees, the proportion of obscenity cases that will result in liberal
precedent is also high.
The judges’ votes then result in unexpectedly more or fewer liberal obscenity de-
cisions for that circuit. These shocks in liberal obscenity decisions (due to randomly
assigned Democratic judges) are akin to natural experiments in laws that are not
influenced by preexisting community standards. Rather, a randomized control trial
is created through the random assignment of judges who interpret the facts and the
law differently.
Random variation in the assignment of appellate judges is an attractive instru-
ment for a number of reasons. The random assignment of judges is exogenous and
unexpected. It varies in both the cross-section and the time series, so it does not rely
on strong assumptions about the comparability of different regions (e.g., circuits) and
122 See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
123 See Herbert M. Kritzer & Robert E. Drechsel, A Portrait of Local News Reporting of
Civil Litigation (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 10-34,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633504.’
124 See Chen & Yeh, supra note 48, at 14–15 (discussing how community organizations
and advocates respond to appellate obscenity decisions); Frank Dobbin & Erin L. Kelly, How
to Stop Harassment: Professional Construction of Legal Compliance in Organizations, 112
AM. J. SOC. 1203, 1220–23 (2007).
125 See Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 124, at 1203.
126 Chen & Yeh, supra note 48, at 16.
127 Id. (“The idiosyncratic variation is not expected ahead of time since judicial assignment
is not revealed to parties until very late . . . and after each litigant’s briefs are filed.”).
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years. The enormous variation in legal decisions due to the judicial panel composition
also makes the empirical design an ideal context to study the consequences of law. We
explain this empirical strategy in technical terms.128
Our analysis of how community standards in sexual norms determines legal prec-
edent in obscenity, which can further affect local sexual attitudes and behaviors, high-
lights a circularity that makes it difficult to evaluate a law’s true impacts on social
change. Correlation does not equal causation. Our empirical strategy recognizes the
endogenous relationship between custom and court-made law and takes advantage of
a natural experiment from the random assignment of judges to court cases as a powerful
tool in evaluating the societal impacts of court-made law.
B. Empirical Model
The basic specification models the changes in precedent at the circuit-year level and
its relationship to individual outcomes of persons, firms, government, or other units:
(1a) Yict = ß0 + ß1Lawct + ict
The dependent variable, Yict , is a measure of outcomes of unit I in circuit c and time
t. The main coefficient of interest is ß1 on Lawct , where Lawct is the measure of
precedent issued in circuit c and year t, such as the percentage of cases with a pro-
plaintiff outcome.129
If legal precedent and economic outcomes are systematically correlated due to
omitted variables, then ß1 is biased. A critical concern with judge-made law is that of
cross-fertilization across different areas of doctrine. If different but related doctrinal
areas have independent effects on economic outcomes, social changes may be mis-
attributed to one legal rule when many legal rules are also changing. Distinguishing
correlation from causation is challenging in observational studies, which are frequently
confounded by other factors moving in tandem with the treatment of interest.130
The common approach of controlling for potential confounders is a multivariate
regression:
(1b) Yict = ß0 + ß1Lawct + ß2Cc + ß3Tt + ß4Cc*Time + ß5Wct +
ß6Xict + ict
but this can exacerbate omitted variable problems.131 With a research design involv-
ing random treatment assignment, adding control variables can add precision to the
128 Id. at 3.
129 See id. at 21.
130 See id. at 22.
131 See id.
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estimates if the controls are strong predictors of the outcomes.132 We can show that
the main estimates are invariant to the inclusion or exclusion of: circuit fixed effects,
Cc, and time fixed effects, Tt, to address whether fixed unobservable differences
within circuits and within time periods are correlated with pro-government takings
precedent and economic outcomes; circuit-specific time trends, Cc*Time, to allow
circuits to be on different trajectories with respect to outcomes; state fixed effects to
address the possible influence of state-specific takings statutes or state interpretation
of federal laws; a vector of observable characteristics, Xict (e.g., gender, education,
and race); and time-varying circuit-level controls, Wct, such as the characteristics of
the pool of judges available to be assigned.
Figure 1: Judicial Composition and Random Assignment, 1971–2004
We construct an instrumental variable that is uncorrelated with possible con-
founders for Lawct such as covarying legal developments or social trends that drive
both legal decisions, Lawct, as well as the outcomes, Yict. This approach addresses the
possible omitted variables bias that creates a spurious correlation between Lawct and
the outcome of interest.133 Figure 1 roughly depicts the intuition for the empirical
strategy, in which we exploit the random variation that arises from using the actual
deviations from the expected probability of a circuit year having judges who were
Democratic appointees.134 The flatter line is the expected number of Democratic
132 Esther Duflo et al., Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A
Toolkit, in HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 3895, 3924 (T. Paul Schultz & John
Strauss eds., 2008).
133 Chen & Yeh, supra note 48, at 23.
134 See id.
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appointees on a panel. The jagged line is the actual number of Democratic appointees
on a panel, in this instance, for abortion cases. (The figure displays the average values
across all circuits, therefore masking some of the actual variation.) Circuit-years re-
ceiving an unexpectedly high proportion of Democratic appointees on their panels
for a particular case category (such as obscenity) receive an unexpectedly higher pro-
portion of liberal decisions in that legal category.135 Each actual spike above the ex-
pected probability of getting a Democrat judge corresponds to the circuit year randomly
receiving a “treatment” of more liberal decisions.136 Thus, changes in outcomes can be
attributed to the “treatment” of liberal laws. Figure 1 suggests the first stage equation:
(2a) Lawct = g0 + g1Treatmentct + g2Cc + g3Tt + g4Cc*Year + 
g5 Xict + ict
We define Lawct as the percentage of decisions that are [liberal] when there are cases
and 0 when there are no cases in a circuit and year. The “Treatment” group (Treatmentct
= 1) comprises individuals living in circuits and years who experience an unexpectedly
higher percentage of liberal decisions. We calculate the difference in Yict for those
treated versus those who are not treated and the difference in Lawct for those treated
versus those who are not treated. The ratio of the two differences in each of the years
after the treatment gives us the treatment effect in that year.137
C. Implementation
We apply this empirical strategy in separate papers,138 where we develop and
implement the econometric models in greater technical detail. To examine the causal
impact of liberal obscenity laws on custom as reflected by local sexual attitudes and
behaviors, we use the random assignment of federal appellate judges who were Demo-
cratic appointees. We document that appellate judges’ Democratic affiliation predicts
that they will favor more permissive obscenity standards.139 Thus, the random assign-
ment of Democratic appointees effectively leads to unanticipated shocks in the percent-
age of obscenity decisions per year that are liberal. Using the same data on obscenity
decisions and from the GSS, our instrumental variables estimates reveal that liberal
obscenity precedents on average lead to progressive sexual customs.140 Progressive
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 Id. at 24. Formally, Treatmentct = 1[(Nct /Mct) > E(Nct /Mct)], where N is the number of
Democratic appointees assigned to all cases of a particular doctrinal category in that circuit
and year (i.e., the number of Democratic appointees assigned to obscenity cases) and M is
the number of cases in a particular doctrinal category in that circuit and year. E[N/M ] is the
expected number of Democratic appointees per given case. Id.
138 Chen & Yeh, supra note 48; Chen & Yeh, supra note 85.
139 Chen & Yeh, supra note 48, at 1.
140 Id.
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sexual attitudes, nonmarital sexual behavior especially by men, prostitution and rape
arrests, and the incidence of STDs increased after liberal obscenity precedent.141
To examine the impact of regulatory and physical takings decisions, we exploit the
random assignment of judges and establish that they vote on takings cases in a man-
ner correlated with their race, political affiliation, and prior government experience.
Through the instrumental variable estimates, we find that appellate decisions favoring
physical takings increase growth by 0.2% points but reduce minority home ownership
and employment by 0.5% and 0.4% points142 respectively. Meanwhile, decisions favor-
ing regulatory takings initially depress property prices but spur economic growth in
the medium run by 0.7% points.143
We also examine the impacts of appellate court decisions allowing takings on sub-
sequent government behavior. We collect novel data on all state exactions since 1990
and use a government dataset of condemnations across the United States. We find that
decisions favoring the government in physical takings cases subsequently displace
commercial tenants and reduce just compensation,144 consistent with an interpretation
of eminent domain doctrine increasing government power.
CONCLUSION
A valuable body of scholarship asserts whether or how custom determines for-
mally adopted laws. At the same time, there is increasing interest among legal scholars
in making causal inferences about the impacts of formal laws such as statutes or court
precedents on social norms or other outcomes. Since custom is not codified, it may
cause these observers to spuriously conclude that a correlation between a formal law
and a social trend is due to the law, when it is likely to be due to custom, whether it
is embodied by the outcome or whether it remains an unobserved factor in the calculus.
This Article illustrates this in the context of First Amendment jurisprudence in obscen-
ity, where custom is explicitly referenced in the written doctrine, and takings juris-
prudence, where custom is not as obvious when trying to determine what constitutes
public use or just compensation.
Our empirical analyses document statistical correlations between sexual norms
and obscenity law and between economic outcomes and takings law. The first corre-
lation suggests that judges are applying the Miller community standards test and rely-
ing on local sexual norms to decide an obscenity case. The second result is consistent
141 We also investigate a causal mechanism hypothesizing that people pay attention to and
are influenced by news reports on obscenity decisions. We show that newspapers report on
appellate obscenity decisions. We also conduct a field experiment assigning workers to tran-
scribe obscenity news reports and find that exposing them to liberal obscenity decisions leads
them to report more permissive sexual attitudes. Id. at 5–6.
142 Chen & Yeh, supra note 85, at 5.
143 Id. at 1.
144 Id. at 23.
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with the idea that local practices can determine both economic trends as well as takings
decisions based on what is considered to be “public use” or “just compensation” in a
particular place and time. Studies examining the effects of laws on people’s behavior
would require understanding the correlation between custom and the law. To identify
the impact of the law on custom, we propose an empirical method that overcomes
the reverse causality issues that would otherwise occur when custom simultaneously
determines the law.
Estimating the causal effects of law on custom is important for a number of
reasons. Understanding the legitimacy of court-made decisions is one such reason;
for example, one theoretical model illustrates how decisions can backfire.145 More-
over, our empirical solution can be a valuable contribution in evaluating legal policy.
Consider a public health crisis, such as an HIV/AIDS outbreak. Policymakers may
want to know what policies could curb STDs, perhaps through behavioral changes in
health customs. They may try to learn from past experience, but observational data
would indicate that previous crises preceded both policy decisions and health customs,
but not that policy decisions affect health customs. Our methodology would inform
policymakers whether their decisions have a causal impact on health customs that may
be related to the incidence of STDs.146 While this Article has cited examples from two
specific areas of legal doctrine, our empirical framework is quite general and can be
applied to thinking about the relationships among norms, customs, and laws amid a
broader interdisciplinary conversation. The theoretical literature in customs and laws
includes works that present taxonomies and works that elucidate mechanisms. Our
empirical framework allows researchers a useful way to test the latter set of theories
with real world laws.
145 See generally Chen, Levonyan & Yeh, supra note 9.
146 We thank our discussant for this insight.
